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Abstract
Wages are an element of cost crucially affecting the competitiveness of individual firms. But
the wage bill is also a crucial element of aggregate demand. Hence it could be that more “flexible”
and fluid labour markets, while allowing for faster inter-firm reallocation of labour, may also render
the whole economic system more fragile, more prone to recession, more volatile. In this work we
investigate some conditions under which such a conjecture applies. The paper presents an agent-
based model that investigates the effects of two “archetypes of capitalism”, in terms of regimes of
labour governance – defined by the mechanisms of wage determination, firing, labour protection
and productivity gains sharing – upon (i) labour market regularities and (ii) macroeconomic dy-
namics (long-term rates of growth, GDP fluctuations, unemployment rates, inequality, etc..). The
model is built upon the “Keynes meets Schumpeter” family of models (Dosi et al., 2010), explicitly
incorporating different microfounded labour market regimes. Our results show that seemingly more
rigid labour markets and labour relations are conducive to coordination successes with higher and
smoother growth.
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1 Introduction
Throughout the history of the economic discipline, a major challenge to all scholars ready to give even
a cursory glance at the evidence, has been the question: why involuntary unemployment? Or, putting
it the other way round, why is not the economic system able to generate levels of activity that absorb
all the labour force willing to work?
The pre-Keynesian answer, as known, is in term of frictions and rigidities in primis on the labour
market itself. And, basically it is also the neo-Keynesian answer, starting as early as the formalization
of Keynes’ model by Hicks (1937) and Modigliani (1944) all the way to the generality of contemporary
New Keynesian DSGEs (Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium models) (Rotemberg and Woodford,
1993 and Blanchard et al., 2015). At a finer level of detail, there are of course differences between
rigidities and frictions of the labour market. The former are typically used in aggregated models and
the latter more in tune with models attempting to find some sort of equilibrium micro-foundation such
as search-and-matching ones (see Yashiv, 2007). Under the rigidity heading, the usual approach is a
model with some nominal rigidities whereby the rigidity itself deprives the underlying Walrasian real
model from its self-equilibrating properties. Conversely, in the friction perspective, it is some real,
decentralised, but equilibrium dynamics to yield involuntary, but frictional unemployment. There is
an alternative view, however, which we believe to be well in tune with Keynes himself. Involuntary
unemployment is the outcome of systematic coordination failures, – in the current economic jargon –,
whereby “bad equilibria” (that is, Pareto-dominated growth paths) are self-fulfilling in decentralised
economies. Leijonhufvud (1973) emphasized how prices can be at their “general equilibrium level”
but still the effective quantity transactions can differ from the notionally desired rates of selling
and buying. Further, under shortfalls of effective demand, prices can even become “false” signals,
exacerbating coordination failures: realised sales are restrictions for demand-signal. As Cooper and
John (1988) insightfully put it:
There is a coordination problem [in “Keynesian economies”] if low level equilibria could be
avoided by a simultaneous increase in the output of all firms. However, in a decentralised
system there may be more incentive for a single firm to increase production because this
agent takes the action of the other given. Hence the “externality” is brought about the
demand linkages that individual firms do not internalize. [pag. 454]
Remarkably, all this has nothing to do with the purported efficiency of markets. On the contrary,
it might well be that higher collective adjustment flexibility might yield worse equilibria/growth paths.
The problem of coordination failures may be seen mainly as problem of strategic complementarities.
An agent i is positively affected by the others N −1 agents behaviours or strategies: that is, in a game
theoretic framework, the best response of agent i has a positive slope. Demand linkages (externalities)
are the typical example of strategic complementarity in a Keynesian framework (see Solow and Stiglitz
(1968) for an early formalization of the lack of aggregate demand). The nexus production-demand-
wages is a paramount example: even though firms would like to pay the minimum possible salaries
to reduce production costs, wages are, collectively, a crucial source of demand. Hence, cascades of
feedbacks between wages, aggregate demand and unemployment can bring the economy to a path
characterised by low (or high) levels of activity.
The problem that Keynes recognized was that wages can be too flexible. Indeed, when
wages fall, people’s income falls and their ability to demand goods falls as well. Lack of
aggregate demand was the problem with the Great Depression, just as lack of aggregate
demand is the problem today. Imposing more wage flexibility can result in exacerbating
the underlying problem of lack of aggregate demand. [Stiglitz (2013), pag. 10]
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The paper presents an agent-based model (ABM) that investigates the effects of different
“archetypes of capitalism” (on the general perspective see Boyer, 1988, Aoki and Dosi, 1992, Hall and
Soskice, 2003, Soskice, 2007), in terms of regimes of labour governance – defined by different mech-
anism of wage determination, firing, labour protection and productivity sharing – upon (i) labour
market regularities, and (ii) macroeconomic dynamics (long-term rates of growth, GDP fluctuations,
unemployment rates, inequality etc..).
Indeed labour markets are characterised by rich institutional specificities reflecting the distinctive
feature of labour as a quite special kind of commodity (cf. the insightful discussion in Solow, 1990).
And such institutions are likely to yield significantly different patterns of labour utilization and mech-
anisms of wage formation. A clear-cut example is the dynamics of unemployment in U.S and U.K. vs.
Continental Europe vs. Scandinavian Countries (within a vast literature, see e.g. Faggio and Nickell,
2007 and Nickell, 1997 for an extensive discussion on the differences across OECD countries in terms
of employment rates and working hours patterns).
Let us start with some definitions of flexibility. According to J. Atkinson (1985) there are multiple
dimensions of that notion, which can be distinguished as: (i) functional flexibility, (ii) external numer-
ical flexibility, (iii) internal numerical flexibility, (iv) financial flexibility. Functional flexibility refers to
the process of redeployment of labour tasks, mansions and required skills within a firm. As technical
change proceeds, functional flexibility allows/requires labour force to update their competencies and
behavioural repertoire. External numerical flexibility implies that workers can be quickly, cheaply and
easily hired-fired. Internal numerical flexibility stands for flexible working time, via e.g. call-out rear-
rangements or flexible rostering. Financial flexibility which we shall call here, more straightforwardly,
monetary wage flexibility, stands for the sensitivity of wages to supply/demand conditions and thus
to unemployment rates. Here we shall address the effects of external numerical and wage flexibility in
our ABM model.
The model is built upon the “Keynes meets Schumpeter” family of models (Dosi et al., 2010,
Napoletano et al., 2012, Dosi et al., 2016b). As Stiglitz (2016) forcefully put it, a tall task of any
satisfactory theory of macro dynamics ought to be able to account for the endogenous emergence of
both mild fluctuations and deep recessions. In this respect, we believe, one obtains insightful results
on the role of the interaction between endogenous demand formation and fiscal policies in Dosi et al.,
2015b; the impact of finance and income inequality in Dosi et al., 2013.1
Here we want to focus on the role of wages and labour market rules. Wages are an element of
cost affecting the competitiveness of individual firms. But the wage bill is also a crucial element of
aggregate demand. Hence it could be that more flexible and “fluid” labour markets, while allowing for
faster inter-firm reallocation of labour and lowering costs, may also render the whole economic system
more fragile, more prone to recession, more volatile. In this work we investigate the conditions under
which such a conjecture applies by exploring to what extent strategic complementarities may lead to
coordination failures (and hence, multiplicity of possible growth paths).
On purpose, the aim of the model which follows is not to calibrate it to any empirical observation,
but rather to show how its basic qualitative properties hold for alternative archetypical configurations.
Still, we find revealing that the properties of “fragility” and potential for deep crises conditional upon
wages misaligned with productivity and the ensuing increasing income inequality, predicated by our
model, are quite in line with the historical circumstances which preceded both the Great Depression of
the Thirties and current Great Recession. A remarkable pattern that they have in common is a great
1In turn, the K+S family of models belong to the broader family of Agent-Based evolutionary models (cf. Tesfatsion
and Judd, 2006, LeBaron and Tesfatsion, 2008, Nelson and Winter, 1982). For related ABM which consider a decentralised
labour market see Fagiolo et al. (2004), Dawid et al. (2008), Deissenberg et al. (2008), Riccetti et al. (2014) and Russo
et al. (2015). See Fagiolo and Roventini (2012) for a survey on macro ABMs.
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moderation of wages with excesses of nearly everything else. So for example, manufacturing weekly
wages in the US fell from 29.48$ in 1920 to 23.12$ in 1922 (and reached 27.36$ in 1929) in a period
characterised by a significant weakening of the unions (Wolman, 1933). Quite similarly, the share of
wages in both GDP and corporate manufacturing value in most countries and most sectors in the two
decades or more preceding the Great Recession dramatically decreased (for a detailed evidence, cf.
Karabarbounis and Neiman, 2014). But, the two deep crises are different in the behaviour of wages
after the eruption of the crisis itself. So for example, in the US they fell by 33.6% from 1929 to 1932
(Wolman, 1933, pag. 2). Conversely, they remained roughly stable in many OECD countries after
2008. And that, we conjecture in line with the model which follows, has been at the heart of the
relative “mildness” of the more recent Recession vis-a- vis the Depression.
Our results show that, indeed, the more flexible are wages and employment, and the weaker
are institutions supporting wages and workers’ welfare, the more fragile is the economy. Keynesian
coordination failures are more frequent, average unemployment and inequality are higher, and crises
are more likely. Conversely, seemingly more rigid labour markets and labour relations are conducive
to coordination successes with higher and smoother growth.
We shall proceed as follows: Section 2 outlines the stylised facts (and non-facts) which a satisfactory
model of the functioning of the labour market and of wage formation ought to be able to address.
Together, we discuss the successes and failures of incumbent models to do so. Section 3 presents the
model. Finally in Section 4 we discuss the simulation results, their adherence to the foregoing stylised
facts, and their implications in terms of relations between the dynamics of wages and that of other
macro variables – aggregate demand, macro fluctuations, unemployment, incidence of crises.
2 The state of the art: facts and theories
2.1 The evidence
As mentioned, a robust way to discriminate among theories is to check their adequacy against a set
of empirical regularities – i.e. “stylised facts” – which pertain to the domain of what one is meant to
explain. We shall follow such a strategy also in the following, with the major caveat the truly stylised
facts in this domain are few and far inbetween.
SF1 Unemployment is a persistent and structural phenomenon of capitalist
economies.
It was undoubtedly so during the Industrial Revolution in Britain and the subsequent Industrial Rev-
olutions in catching-up countries; it is so even now in less developed countries (“the unlimited supply
of labour” of Lewis (1954) still holds well) and it applies throughout the whole history of developed
economies. Unemployment persistently fluctuates intertwined by major crises, such as in 1929 and
in 2008, with unemployment reaching in many countries one fourth of the labour supply or more.
The litmus test for any model, we believe, is to account for such a secular stylised fact. The other
possible stylised facts are in comparison second order ones. Remarkably, on the theory side, whenever
involuntary unemployment is even acknowledged – which is most often not the case – the drivers are
identified almost exclusively on the supply side. Consider Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) among the
most nuanced voices in this perspective: they propose a model where the interaction between aggre-
gate shocks (e.g. changes in TFP and in the real interest rate, etc.) and institutional factors (coverage
and duration of unemployment benefit systems, centralization and coordination level of wage determi-
nation, employment protection, labour taxes) determine the persistent unemployment rate. Indeed,
essentially all supply-side factors. And it is also on this side that the roots of any persistence, in
4
that view, should be found: the hysteresis hypothesis (Blanchard and Summers, 1986 and Ball, 2009)
proposes that short-run unemployment rates affect also the long-run equilibrium unemployment rate
(the NAIRU, Non Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment) via the supply of labour itself.
SF2 Unemployment rates, real wages and monetary wages co-movements
A long-standing literature, pioneered by the evidence analysed by Phillips (1958) suggests an inverse
relation between rates of change of monetary wages and unemployment rates. This has been indeed
for a long-time a pillar of the “old” and later of the New Keynesian ones (DSGE with frictions or
rigidities). The empirical evidence on such relation is all but conclusive: in fact it implies that the
“queues” of unemployed people are able to influence the monetary wage rate paid by firms. Doubts on
the Phillips curve are cast by Solow (1990) and more recently by Blanchard et al. (2015).
A much stronger empirical support goes to the wage curve, which relates real wages and unem-
ployment rates (typically at local level): so, Blanchflower and Oswald (1994), in an extensive regional
analysis covering twelve countries, found elasticities of around −0.1. Note that on the theoretical
side a wage curve is not consistent with any interpretation of unemployment in terms of mismatching
between labour demand and labour supply because in that case unemployment and wages should be
positively correlated (see Blanchflower, 1995 and Blanchflower and Oswald, 2005 for extensive dis-
cussions). The wage curve seems to apply to both the short- and long-run (i.e. it is not a purely
cyclical phenomenon), consistent with the presence of a bargaining process, according to which in
case of high unemployment, unions would ask for low wages in order to ensure job positions, and/or
efficiency wages, where in a depressed labour market workers would accept low wages, even though
putting higher work efforts because of the threat of being easily substituted. In fact, the empirical
wage curve is theoretically consistent with “unemployment as discipline device” (Shapiro and Stiglitz,
1984), or similarly, the Marxian reserve army. Conversely it is not consistent with any decreasing re-
turn production function, where increases in unemployment should be associated with lower marginal
productivity of labour and lower wages.
SF3 The Beveridge curve
Firms expand and contract, hiring and firing workers, and workers – unemployed and sometimes
employed ones – look for a job with, mixed success. However, changes in aggregate activity yield
changes in the rates of job destruction so that unemployment and vacancy rates ought to be negatively
correlated. The evidence on such Beveridge curve is discussed in Blanchard et al. (1989), Cooper et al.
(2007).
SF4 Separation and hiring rates are highly volatile and to the same order of
magnitude. Job-finding rates are pro-cyclical.
These set of stylised facts regards the flow of workforce, moving from unemployed to employed status or
vice-versa (where the separation rate includes both firing and voluntary quitting), from unemployment
to inactivity (or vice versa), from one job to another one (Yashiv, 2007). There is no consensus on
which of the two components, whether the separation rate or the job-finding rate, drive unemployment
fluctuations. The former view is sustained in the earlier studies by Blanchard et al. (1989) and Davis
and Haltiwanger (1990), while the latter is suggested by more recent studies (Shimer, 2012). Overall,
the high frequency volatility of both components hint at a rather turbulent labour market dynamics
(at least in the U.S. to which most studies apply).
SF5 Unemployment and vacancy rates are one order of magnitude more volatile
than productivity
As discussed in Cooper et al. (2007) and Shimer (2005), the standard deviation of both vacancies and
unemployment is around ten times higher then the one of labour productivity (even if pro-cyclical too).
And this is indeed a major puzzle for any equilibrium, supply side interpretation of unemployment
fluctuations cum standard production functions (recall the Sheppard Lemma...).
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SF6 The Okun curve
GDP growth rates and unemployment rates are negatively correlated. In particular, in its seminal
paper Okun (1962) estimates that an increase of 2 − 3% of GDP is associated with just 1% point
increase in employment. Okun emphasizes how this relation is the result of the combination of many
factors like the potential gains in productivity and the number of working hours. There is obviously
no reason to believe that the coefficient remains constant over time and across countries. Nonetheless,
what is relevant is the negative cross correlation which tells macroeconomists about a robust positive
correlation between output growth rates and productivity growth rates (see among others Prachowny,
1993). The same evidence might be interpreted in a more structuralist perspective, in our view
complementary to the Okun curve: under conditions of increasing returns, output growth is likely to
yield permanent productivity increases. This is the neglected Verdoon-Kaldor Law : see Kaldor (1975),
Verdoorn (1980), and McCombie and Ridder (1984).
SF7 Unemployment and Inequality are positively correlated
Income inequality has fortunately re-emerged as a focus in the recent economic debate. But what is the
relation between unequal income distribution and unemployment? There are two complementary ones
nearest our argument here. One, proposed in Stiglitz (2012) and in Stiglitz (2015), suggests that high
income inequality induces a lack of aggregate demand which turns out in higher unemployment rates,
having rich people a lower propensity to consume. An alternative interpretation goes conversely from
unemployment to inequality: during recessionary phases low income workers are more severely hit by
layoffs. This implies that income concentration diverts toward upper classes (see Heathcote et al.,
2010). Maestri and Roventini (2012) find evidence of a positive cross correlation between inequality
and unemployment in Canada, Sweden, and the US.
(NON) SF8 Negative correlation between labour market flexibility and unem-
ployment rate
Of course a precious piece of evidence with bearing upon the results that follow concerns the rela-
tionship between the degrees of labour market “perfection” and unemployment rates. Needless to say,
there is an unquestionable consensus among “mainstream” scholars that labour market rigidities are
the source of unemployment. However, the evidence presented to support the structural reforms recipe
is all but robust (Freeman, 2005). The well-known OECD (1994) Jobs Study was among the first stud-
ies to advocate the benefits from labour market liberalization. The report and a series of subsequent
papers (including Scarpetta, 1996, Siebert, 1997, Belot and Van Ours, 2004, Bassanini and Duval,
2006) basically argued that the roots of unemployment rest in social institutions and policies such as
unions, unemployment benefits, employment protection legislation. Unfortunately, at least an equiv-
alent numbers of papers pointed out the fragility and unreliability of the empirical evidence used to
support the claim. Particularly, Howell et al. (2007), reviewing the findings on the effects of protective
labour market policies (PMLI) on unemployment, argue that the evaluation of the effects of PMLI has
been biased by a number of factors: (i) the findings were largely theory driven discarding the empirical
evidence, (ii) the explanatory powers of labour market institutions as sources of unemployment decline
with the quality of the PMLI indicators and the sophistication of the econometric methodology, (iii)
inclination to violate the mantra against endogeneity, phrasing simple cross-correlations as evidence
of causation, (iv) remarkable differences in the magnitude of coefficients, statistical significance, and
estimation methodology across the works. Even more distinctively, Oswald (1997), Baccaro and Rei
(2007), Avdagic and Salardi (2013), Avdagic (2015) and Storm and Naastepad (2012) on more recent
datasets find no compelling evidence on the revealed benefits of labour market liberalization. In fact,
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Adascalitei and Pignatti (2015) and Adascalitei et al. (2015) find that higher labour market flexibility
increases short run unemployment rate and, together, reduces employment rates.2
2.2 The theories
What does the theory says about the foregoing stylised facts (and the lack of them)?
Remarkably, since the old debate between Malthus and Ricardo around two centuries ago, rhetor-
ically won by the latter, and with the outstanding exceptions of Marx (partly) and Keynes, aggregate
demand has been eschewed from the interpretation of all persistent regularities in economic phe-
nomena. And the labour market ones are no exception.3 In so far as involuntary unemployment is
acknowledged at all, it is accounted for in terms of frictions or rigidities, under the heading of “stock
models with rigidities” and “flow models with frictions”. The former find their own root in some notion
of NAIRU. These models introduce the idea of nominal rigidities, according to which nominal wage do
not adjust to excess supply of labour. The sluggishness in the adjustment process has been typically
formalised by means of the Phillips curve, notwithstanding its controversial empirics (see above). In-
deed, when changes in the nominal wage growth rate are linked to price changes, the Phillips curve
can be expressed both in terms of nominal or real price rigidities and the unemployment rate can be
seen as deviation from the NAIRU cum inflationary pressures (see Lubik and Krause, 2014).
Within the same stream of literature, but with more emphasis on institutionally induced rigidities,
models of the genre of Layard et al. (2005) determine the“natural rate”as the intersection of supply and
demand curves, whose slopes are shaped by the purported rigidities on the labour market (e.g. union
power, employment protection, wage benefits) and the product market (monopolistic competition,
mark-up pricing, etc.) (e.g. see Blanchard, 2006). The Layard-Nickell-Jackman family of models
are, in fact, stock models with institutional rigidities. The empirical counterpart of these models are
usually panel regressions which try to estimate unemployment as the combined interactions of shocks
and institutions (see Nickell et al., 2005).
And, finally, one ought to consider part of this overall perspective also the attempt to add price
rigidities due to some sort of “objective” fixed costs within so-called New Classical models whereby no
sort of expectational myopia is allowed (for an early attempt, cf. Calvo, 1983). And, indeed, this was
basically the route taken later in order to incorporate “homoeopathic quantities of Keynesianism” in
DSGE models.
Of course, none of the above family of models is microfounded, unless one deems the purported
normative behaviour of any representative agent as an acceptable microfoundation.4 Conversely, the
literature on flow models with friction attempts precisely to do that, grounding it over an overwhelming
micro evidence on job creation and destruction flows at the firm level (see Davis and Haltiwanger,
1990). Search and matching models focus on the dynamics of the workforce of the firm which, as
Blanchard and Diamond (1992) put it, feature three processes: a labour demand specified in terms
of job creation and destruction flows, a matching process between firms and workers, and a wage
determination mechanism. They are microfunded, optimising models that address questions like:
how unemployment and job vacancies are determined as equilibrium phenomena, what determines
2Even Blanchard (2006) recognises how establishing causality effects from panel data regressions is beyond the scope
of the exercise, being the possible co-evolution between the dependent variable (unemployment) and the covariates (e.g.
duration of unemployment benefit) extremely hard to identify.
3We were reminded of the Malthus-Ricardo debate by a recent work, unfortunately available only in Italian, by La
Malfa (2015) on Keynes, who vehemently argues, after a thorough examination of the correspondence between the two,
that the dominance of the Ricardian supply perspective has been a “disaster” for the progress of economic analysis for a
century or so (Keynes, 1972 p. 97-98, as cited in La Malfa (2015)).
4For a devastating critique on the representative agent see Kirman, 1992 and Forni and Lippi, 1997 on the flaws of
aggregation in macroeconomic models.
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the transition from unemployed to employed states (and vice versa), ad what determines equilibrium
wages. The “grains of sand” in these mechanisms are, at best, local informational imperfections. The
benchmark remains a fluid and flexible labour market which would allow the best matching between
firms and workers, thus minimising unemployment. At the same time, institutional rigidities (like
unemployment benefits) remain, carrying with them higher salaries and lower rates of labour activity.
How do both streams of literature fare against the evidence? In our view rather poorly. In primis,
neither of the two families of models is able to address the occurrence of repeated although relatively
infrequent deep crises (Stiglitz, 2016) characterised by abnormally high unemployment rates (SF1).
Even at a finer level of observation and, so to speak, in “normal” times both families appear to be
unable to account, first, for unemployment fluctuations at business cycle frequencies. Stock models
with rigidity seem largely off the mark, unless one postulates an unobservable stochastic process on
aggregate supply (technological) shocks reflected by the observed employment time series. Here, one
gets even beyond the “science fiction” of Real Business Cycle.
Second, search and matching (S&M) models, too, lack the ability to match business cycles fre-
quencies, on several dimensions. They are patently inconsistent with any wage curve and are also
unable to reproduce the empirical high volatility of vacancies and hiring which comes, as mentioned
above, together with a much milder variability of labour productivity. Certainly, there is nowadays
a broad consensus that the microfoundation of S&M models, i.e. the Nash bargaining process used
for the wage determination is at odds with empirical evidence. The critique by Shimer (2005) and
Cooper et al. (2007) is particularly relevant in this respect. Even if there are aggregate supply shocks
on productivity, which we doubt, and even if they happen to be mildly pro cyclical, which we find
questionable, the puzzle is that they get amplified by an order of magnitude in terms variability in
the hiring/firing rates. In turn, this is obviously inconsistent with DSGE and S&M models.
Then what next? There is an alternative, largely unexplored, path. First and foremost, it ac-
knowledges the possibility of multiple quasi equilibria as Krugman (2011) puts it. Which one is
chosen crucially depends also on the mechanisms of coordination (or lack of it) in the labour market
and the ensuing patterns of aggregate demand generation. Second, it builds on microfoundations
which fully account for far-from-equilibrium interactions among agents also on the labour market,
in addition to product and financial markets. Third, it takes on board the diversity of institutions
governing market interactions and prices formation.
In this vein, unlike analyses that consider labour market dynamics as a purely or primarily as
a supply side phenomenon, the route we are going to undertake here is a genuinely Keynesian one.
It is not a fairytale of menu costs and arbitrary price rigidities. No even just an efficiency wage
one. It is a story of “endemic” coordination failures. In that, institutional set-ups which might favour
the reduction of frictions and thus, other things being equal, favour allocative efficiency, might as
well reduce the overall rate of activity of the whole economy via a feedback mechanism that goes
from wages to aggregate demand, from aggregate demand to labour demand, from labour demand
to unemployment. Conversely, a relatively rigid regime, characterised by sticky wages and relatively
low inter-firm labour mobility due to the high level of wages might well ensure relative stability and
frequent full-employment states, notwithstanding all the frictions in the matching process.
3 The model
The model is a general disequilibrium agent-based one, populated by heterogeneous firms and workers
who behave according to bounded rational behavioural rules. Building on the basic structure of the
Keynes+Schumpeter model (Dosi et al., 2010) the present version allows for a process of decentralised
worker allocation across firms (see Figure 1).
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Figure 1: The model structure. Boxes in bold style represent heterogeneous agents populations
The economy is composed of three populations of heterogeneous agents, F1 capital-good firms,
(denoted by the subscript i), F2 consumption-good firms (denoted by the subscript j), L
S con-
sumers/workers (denoted by the subscript `), plus a bank and the Government. Capital-good firms
invest in R&D and produce heterogeneous machine-tools, whose productivity evolves over time.
Consumption-good firms combine machines bought from capital-good firms and labour in order to
produce an homogeneous product for consumers. There is a minimalistic financial system represented
by a single bank that provides finance to firms only, so they can borrow to produce and invest (and pay
interest on it). Workers submit job applications to a random subset of firms, which hire according to
expectations about demand. Note that the firm demand for labour is independent from the wage levels
(alike an ensemble of fixed coefficient production functions). Consumption-good firms form adaptive
expectation about future demand for product and decide thereafter their desired demand for labour.5
The government levies taxes on firms and pays unemployment benefits.
In the following we are going to present and discuss two alternative labour market regimes, labelled
Fordist and Competitive, and variations thereof. They entail distinct and explicit microfounded labour
markets, distinguished by some key aspects, like the search activity, the firing rules adopted by firms
and the mechanism of wage determination. Let us consider the model depicted in Figure 1 at some
more detail. The Appendix shows the bare-bone model, Tables 8 and 9 present the labour market
variables and parameters set-up. The full model is presented in details in Dosi et al. (2010) and
summarised in the Appendix.
3.1 The capital- and consumption- good sectors
The capital-good industry is the locus where innovation is endogenously generated in the economy.
Capital-good firms develop new technologies or imitate the ones of their competitors in order to
produce and sell more productive and cheaper machine tools that are supplied to consumption-good
firms. Capital-good firms invest a fraction of their past profits and/or borrowed funds in R&D in
5Following a typical Keynesian expectation formation whereby past demand affect investment and production decisions
today.
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order to discover new machines or copy existing ones. They produce machine-tools by employing only
labour and set prices as a fixed mark-up over unit costs of production.
Consumption-good firms produce homogeneous goods employing capital (composed by different
vintages of machines) and labour, under constant returns to scale. Desired production, as mentioned,
is determined according to adaptive demand expectations. Given the actual inventories, if the capital
stock is not sufficient to produce the desired production, consumption-good firms invest in new ma-
chines in order to expand their production capacity (if they have accumulated profits or are able to
access bank credit). They may also invest to replace old machines according to a payback-period rule.
As new machines embed state-of-the-art technologies, the labour productivity of consumption-good
firms increases over time according to the mix of vintages of machine present in their capital stocks.
The capital-good market is characterized by imperfect information and Schumpeterian competition
driven by technological innovation oriented to the reduction of machine costs and the increase in ma-
chine productivity. Machine-tool firms signal the price and productivity of their machines to their
actual customers as well to of potential new ones. Consumption-good firms choose in every period
their supplier comparing the price and the productivity of the machines they are aware of.
Imperfect information is also the normal state of the consumption-good market. As a consequence,
consumers cannot instantaneously switch to the most competitive producer even if the good is homo-
geneous. Consumption-good firms fix their prices applying a variable mark-up on their production
costs, heuristically trying to balance higher profits and market share changes. Thus, mark-up dynam-
ics is driven by the evolution of the latter: firms increase their price whenever their market share is
expanding and vice versa. In turn, market shares evolve according to a (quasi) replicator dynamics:
more competitive firms expand while firms with relatively lower competitiveness level shrink, or die.
3.2 Labour market regimes
Let us focus here on the labour side of the model exploring the properties of different alternative of
searching, firing and wage determination mechanisms. We comparatively study two archetypical types
of decentralised labour markets, which we shall call the Fordist regime and the Competitive regime.
The two regimes capture alternative wage-labour nexus in the words of the Regulation Theory6 (see,
within a vast literature, Boyer and Saillard, 2005). Three main domains of the capitalist dynamics
are especially relevant for our analysis, namely: (i) the accumulation regime which entails the relation
among technological progress, income distribution and aggregate demand, (ii) the institutional forms
which encompass the wage-labour nexus (Freeman, 2007) and nature of the State, (iii) the mode of
regulation which is the mechanism by which the former two categories evolve, develop and interact.
The modes of regulation capture the specificities of disequilibrium process of adjustments in the
accumulation patterns and in the coordination among different types of actors. The dynamics entails
phases of “smooth” coordination, mismatches, cycles and crises.
The two regimes are telegraphically sketched in Table 1. Under the Fordist regime wages are insen-
sitive to labour market conditions but indexed to productivity. There is a sort of lifetime employment
(firms fire only when their profits are negative) matched by the loyalty of the workers to their employers
(employed workers do not seek for alternative occupations). Labour market institutions contemplate
a minimum wage indexed on productivity and unemployment benefits.
Conversely under (different versions of) the Competitive regime, wage changes respond to unem-
ployment. Also employed worker with some probability search for notionally more rewarding jobs.
Firms fire their excess workforce given their planned production. Minimum wages are only partially
indexed to productivity, if at all and unemployment benefits might or might not be there.
6For a recent low dimensional formalization of the Regulation Theory, see Dosi et al. (2015a).
10
Regime Fordist Competitive
Wage sensitivity to unemployment rigid flexible
Search intensity unemployed only unemployed and employed
Firing under losses only shrinkage on production
Unemployment benefits yes yes/no
Minimum wage productivity indexation full full/partial/no
Table 1: The two archetypical labour regimes
3.2.1 Matching and hiring
The aggregate supply of labour LS is given. Total desired labour stock by any firm is determined by
the ratio between the desired production Qdj,t and the average productivity of the employed capital
stock Aj,t.
Ldj,t =
Qdj,t
Aj,t
(1)
In turn, desired production is based on expected demand Dej,t, computed via a simple adaptive rule:
7
Dej,t = g(Dj,t−1, Dj,t−2, Dj,t−h), 0 < h < t (2)
where Dj,t−h is the demand actually faced by firm j at time t − h (h is an integer and g > 0 is a
function ). The desired level of production Qdj,t depends on the expected demand as well as on the
desired inventories Ndj,t and the actual stock of inventories left from previous period Nj,t−1:
Qdj,t = D
e
j,t +N
d
j,t −Nj,t−1 (3)
If the desired capital stock (Kdj ) – computed as a function of the desired level of production – is higher
than the current capital stock, firms invest (EIdj ) in order to expand their production capacity:
EIdj,t = K
d
j,t −Kj,t (4)
In each period, according to the dynamics of the market, firms have to decide whether to hire workers.
The decision is taken according to the expected production Qdj,t. In case of an increase in production,
∆Ldj,t new workers are hired in addition to the existing people Lj,t−1:
if ∆Qdj,t = Q
d
j,t −Qj,t−1 > 0 ⇒ hire ∆Ldj,t = Ldj,t − Lj,t−1 workers (5)
More precisely, under the redundancy rules of the Competitive regime an increase in the desired
production always entails a positive variation in labour demand. Not so under the Fordist regime
wherein labour hoarding is always a possibility. Each firm j will get, in probability, a fraction of the
number of applicant workers ωLa in its candidates queue, proportional to firm market share fj,t−1:
Lsj,t = ωL
afj,t−1, ωLa > 0 (6)
where ω is a scaling factors depending on the number of queues each job seeker is allowed to join and
Lsj,t is the number of workers who are in the queue of firm j. When ω > 1 workers apply to more
than one firm at a time, so firms may not be able to hire all workers in their queue. Considering the
7Note that the exact type of adaptive expectation rule does not significantly affect the performance of the firms and
of the system as a whole. If anything, more sophisticated ones might worsen measures of performance, see Dosi et al.
(2006) and Dosi et al. (2016a).
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workers in the queue {`sj,t}, each firm has to select to which worker ` propose its wage offer. The set
of desired workers {`dj,t}, among those in the queue, is defined as:
{`dj,t} = {`j,t ∈ {`sj,t} : wr`,t < woj,t}, {`dj,t} ⊆ {`sj,t} (7)
that is, the firm targets workers that would accept its wage offer woj,t, considering the wage w
r
`,t
requested by them. So, the number of effectively hired workers is #{`dj,t} = Lj,t ≤ ∆Ldj,t ≤ Lsj,t, given
that each firm will hire a number of workers up to its own demand or to all workers in its queue,
whatever is lower. To Lj,t workers, with the lowest requested wages, is offered a job.
3.2.2 Search, wage determination and firing
The search, wage determination and firing processes differ between the two regimes.
Fordist regime
As mentioned, in the Fordist regime we do rule out any job search by employed workers: they do
not quit voluntary and only unemployed people search for a job and firms don’t fire except if they
are incurring losses. Concerning wage determination, wages are unilaterally offered by firms and are
determined as follows:
woj,t = w
o
j,t−1(1 +WPj,t), if WPj,t > 0 (8)
where WPj,t is the wage premium is defined as:
WPj,t = ψ1
∆At
At−1
+ ψ2
∆Aj,t
Aj,t−1
(9)
with At the aggregate labour productivity and Aj,t the firm specific labour productivity. A distinc-
tive feature of the regime is that gains in labour productivity and hence, indirectly the benefit from
innovative activities conduced by firm, are passed trough wages. Moreover, wages are not only linked
to firm specific performance but also to the aggregate performance of the economy. Finally, note that
woj,t is applied to all workers of firm j, so there is no intra-firm differential in wages. Indeed the Fordist
regime describes a wage-labour nexus where worker purchasing power is linked with productivity gains
for firms: the sum of ψ1 and ψ2 act as an institutional parameter which establishes the division of
productivity gains between firms and workers. Under the Fordist regime it is straightforward to set
it equal to 1. This wage determination process induces a twofold virtuous cycle: one which goes from
productivity to wages and the other from investments to profits.
Each firm can afford to pay a salary up to a break-even wage wMAXj,t that is the wage compatible
with zero unit profits. The maximum wage is defined as the product between prices pj,t−1 times
expected productivity Aj,t−1:
wMAXj,t = pj,t−1Aj,t−1, w
o
j,t ≤ wMAXj,t (10)
Firms fire workers only when suffering losses (negative profits Πj,t−1), that is, real revenues are
lower than effective costs:
Πj,t−1 < 0⇒ ∆Ldj,t < 0 (11)
Historically, the “Golden Age”, that is the three decades after WWII, notwithstanding inter-country
variations, quite closely resembles such Fordist wage-labour nexus.
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Competitive regime
The social compromise embodied in the Fordist Regime is irrelevant in the Competitive setting wherein
the wage determination is flexible to labour market conditions. Workers can quit, searching for better
jobs, sending applications in any period to a given number of firms. Employment-to-employment
movement are then allowed. Workers have a reservation wage equal to the unemployment benefit wut
they would receive in case of unemployment. This is an aggregated level variable. The requested worker
salary is a function of the individual unemployment conditions. If the worker has been unemployed
in the previous period, his wage request wr`,t will be weakened by a lower degree of bargaining power.
In facts, she will request the maximum between the reservation wage (aggregate variable) and its own
satisfying wage ws`,t, which includes the recent worker-wage history:
wr`,t =
max(wut , ws`,t) if ` is unemployed in t-1w`,t−1(1 + ) if ` is employed in t-1 (12)
being  a positive parameter. The satisfying wage is defined as:
ws`,t =
1
Ts
Ts∑
h=1
w`,t−h, Ts > 0 (13)
that is the moving average salary of the last Ts periods (parameter). After having received appli-
cations from workers, the wage offered by a firm corresponds to the minimum amount that satisfies
enough workers in its queue, considering the required number of workers to hire for the period (∆Ldj,t).
Therefore, it is the higher wage among the smallest set of the cheapest workers in the queue:
woj,t = maxw
r
`,t, ` ∈ {`dj,t} and #{`dj,t} ≤ ∆Ldj,t (14)
The received salary w`,t is always a satisfying one. But, in each period workers may search for better-
paid jobs. If they do, they decide whether quitting or not from firm j, according to the rule
quit if won6=j,t > w
r
`,t−1 (15)
that is, a worker ` quits firm j if she receives an wage offer won6=j,t from at least one firm n among the
others that is strictly higher than its own required wage. In this set-up, the unemployment condition
becomes crucial in determining the wage request: unlike the Fordist case where both firm level and
aggregate level variables enter in the wage determination, here only individual unemployment status
does affect wage determination. This implies that wages are respondent and flexible to unemployment
condition.
Firing occurs whenever firm j desires a shrinkage of its production, ∆Qdj,t, irrespective to its real
profitability or to the medium- and long-term perspectives for it:
∆Qdj,t < 0⇒ ∆Ldj,t < 0 (16)
This specification models what we called above numerical flexibility : firms are free to fire without
encountering any institutional restriction. Manpower is flexible and can easily hired and thrown out.
Historically, the Competitive regime qualitatively matches both the pre 1929 crisis and to some extent
also the Thatcher-Reagan periods, characterised by a low level of employment protection legislation
or at least by its reduction.
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3.3 Government sector and closure of the model
Unemployed workers receive a subsidy (wut ) which is a fraction of the current wage:
wut = ψ
1
LS
LS∑
`=1
w`,t−1, ψ [0, 1] (17)
Given the total labour demand LDt , the total amount of unemployment subsidies to be paid by the
Government (Gt) is:
Gt = w
u
t (L
S − LDt ) (18)
We assume workers fully consume their income.8 Accordingly, desired aggregate consumption
Cdt depends on the income of both employed and unemployed workers plus the desired unsatisfied
consumption from the previous period (the Cdt−1 − Ct−1 term):
Cdt =
LS∑
`=1
w`,t−1 +Gt + (Cdt−1 − Ct−1) (19)
Ct = min(C
d
t−1 −Q2t ), Q2t =
F2∑
j=1
Qj,t (20)
being Ct the effective demand, that is bounded by the effective production of firms in the consumption-
good sector Q2t . Taxes paid by firms on their profits are gathered by the Government at the fixed
tax rate tr. Finally, the Government (except in the most extreme competitive set-ups) establishes an
institutional minimum wage which imposes a lower bound to firm specific wage setting behaviour:
wminPolicyt = w
minPolicy
t−1
(
1 + ψ1
∆At
At−1
)
(21)
The dynamics generated at the micro level by the decisions of a multiplicity of heterogeneous adaptive
agents and by their interactions is the explicit microfoundation for all aggregate variables of interest
(e.g., output, investment, employment).
The model satisfies the standard national account identities: the sum of value added of capital- and
consumption goods firms Yt equals their aggregated production Q
1
t + Q
2
t (in our simplified economy
there are no intermediate goods). Total production, in turn, coincides with the sum of aggregate
effective consumption Ct, investment It and change in inventories ∆Nt:
F1∑
i=1
Qi,t +
F2∑
j=1
Qj,t = Q
1
t +Q
2
t = Yt = Ct + It + ∆Nt, Q
1
t =
F1∑
i=1
Qi,t (22)
3.4 Timeline of the events
1. Machine-tool firms (sector 1) perform R&D, trying to discover new products and more efficient
production techniques and to imitate the technologies and the products of their competitors.
New machines, when found, are characterised by higher productivity in their production (i.e.
they are cheaper) and/or in their use. Capital-goods producing firms signal their machines to
consumption-good firms.
8The above is equivalent to assume that workers are credit constrained and therefore cannot engage in standard
consumption smoothing. Notice that the conclusions of the paper qualitatively hold as long as, in good Keynesian
fashion (e.g. Kaldor, 1955), the propensity to consume out of profits is lower that that out of wages.
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2. Consumption-good firms (sector 2) decide how much to produce and invest. If gross investment
is positive, consumption-good firms choose their supplier and send their orders. Moreover, their
desired production determines firm-specific labour demand.
3. In order to fulfil their production and investment plans, firms first allocate their cash-flows and
they, if need borrow from a bank up to a multiple of their cash flows.
4. Each firm determines how many positions have to be open, in front of which job-seekers stochas-
tically “queue” (which in one regime are made only by unemployed workers and in the other also
by employed seekers).
5. Depending on the wage setting regimes, wages are set and vacancies are partly or totally filled.
6. The Government pays unemployment subsidies.
7. Imperfectly competitive consumption-good market opens. The market shares of firms evolve
according to their price competitiveness.
8. Firms in both sectors compute their profits, repay debt and distribute dividends.
9. Entry and exit take places. In both sectors firms with near zero market shares or negative net
liquid assets are eschewed from the two industries and replaced by new ones.
10. Machines ordered at the beginning of the period are delivered and become part of the capital
stock at time t+ 1.
11. At the end of each period, aggregate variables (e.g. GDP, investment, employment) are com-
puted, summing over the corresponding microeconomic variables.
3.5 The explored regimes
Below we shall analyse the two regimes and some variants thereof, comparing their performance in
terms of both short and long-run dynamics. More precisely we shall study the following five alternative
scenarios:
1. Fordist (which we shall consider the reference set-up).
2. Competitive with full indexation of minimum wage and unemployment benefits.
3. Competitive with partial indexation of minimum wage and no unemployment benefits.
4. Competitive with full indexation of minimum wage and no unemployment benefits.
5. Competitive without minimum wage and without unemployment benefits.
4 Empirical Validation
Let us start by empirically validating the model and present a set of stylised facts that we are able to
replicate, in addition to the long list of stylised facts both at the firm and at the macro-level which
the incumbent family of the K+S models is able to reproduce (see Dosi et al., 2016b, for an extensive
discussion). Table 2 recalls all such empirical regularities with the ones presented and extensively
discussed in the current paper in bold type. In what follows our focus will be on the empirical
regularities of the labour market discussed in Section 2.
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Firm level SF Aggregate level SF
Skewed firm size distribution Endogenous self-sustained growth
with persistent fluctuations
Fat-tailed firm growth rate distribution Fat-tailed GDP growth rate distribution
Productivity heterogeneity across firms Relative volatility of GDP,
consumption and investment
Persistent productivity differentials among firms Cross-correlation of macro variables
Lumpy investment rates at firm-level Pro-cyclical aggregate R&D investment
Persistent unemployment
Wage curve
Beveridge curve
Okun curve
Separation and hiring rates volatility
Matching function
Productivity, unemployment
and vacancy rates volatility
Unemployment and inequality correlation
Table 2: Stylised facts matched by the model
In Figures 2, 3, 4, 5 we present the results for both the Fordist and the Competitive regimes (in
each most institutionally rich form, i.e. set-up 2, above). Figures 2.a and 2.b show the output of a
bandpass filter (BPF parameters 6, 32, 12) applied on unemployment, vacancy and productivity (in
logs), for the two regimes respectively.9 Productivity presents a longer period than unemployment
and vacancies, consistent with the long-run trend shown in Figures 2.c and 2.d. Figures 3.a and 3.b
illustrate the vacancy-unemployment (v/u) ratio and the labour productivity, both constructed like in
Shimer (2005). The v/u ratio and productivity are expressed as deviations from a Hodrick-Prescott
filter (HP smoothing parameter 105), this time to remove only long-term trends. Consistently with
empirical data, the range of oscillations of the v/u ratio is one order of magnitude higher than that
of the labour productivity. In doing that the model answers to the Shimer critique and outperforms
a large body of search and matching models. Figures 3.c and 3.d show the separation probability
produced by the model; additionally Figures 4 and 5 report the Beveridge curve and the Matching
function, and the Wage and the Okun curves respectively.
Even if the general dynamics between the two regimes may look similar, several features are
markedly different. Comparing the Wage and the Okun curves, for instance, while there is no significant
inclination in the Fordist regime, confirming a wage-labour nexus wherein wages are insensitive to
unemployment condition and output growth cannot be fostered by reducing unemployment, a steep
negative correlation emerges in the Competitive one, where wages are much more influenced by the
unemployment rate. Additionally, it should be noted that the matching function – the relation among
the probability of finding a job and v/u – has a negative inclination in the Fordist regime and,
conversely, a positive one in the Competitive one more in line with contemporary empirical evidence.
This important difference attains to the specification of the search activity: in the Fordist regime only
unemployed people search for a job, then the higher the number of unemployed people consequently
the lower is v/u and the higher is the job finding rate. This justifies the negative correlation between
the two variables. However, when employed people are also job-searching, as in the Competitive
regime, this mechanism nullifies and the expected positive correlation is recovered.
9As known, the filtering allows to identify frequency components of the series, detrending them and isolating business
cycle components (see Baxter and King, 1999).
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More in details, Table 3 illustrates the correlation structures of the model for the labour market in
the two set-ups. In those tables we replicate the analysis performed in Shimer (2005), where the labels
stand, respectively, for unemployment (u), vacancy (v), job finding (f), separation (s) and productivity
(p). The latter Table shows how the Fordist regime matches all but one result, namely the job finding
rate correlation, consistently with the negative slope of the matching function discussed above. The
unemployment-vacancy correlation is negative, the separation probability is negatively correlated with
vacancy and positively correlated with unemployment. Productivity is negatively correlated with the
separation rate. In reference to Table 3, the Competitive regime is even better in matching (recent)
empirical data while keeping immune to the Shimer critique: the standard deviation of v/u is one order
of magnitude higher than the productivity one. Conversely, the Fordist regime, being most of the time
in full employment, exhibits a lower level of unemployment variance as compared to (relatively recent)
empirical data.
Table 4 illustrates the long-run dynamics of GDP, consumption, investment, productivity and
real wage. Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests indicate the presence of unit roots in most cases,
justifying the application of the BPF. All variables grow in the range (2.5%− 3.0%) in both regimes,
indicating the push represented by the Schumpeterian “engine” in the supply side, as detailed in Dosi
et al. (2010). We shall come back to the long-run results of the model in next section. Finally, Tables
5 and 5 show the correlation structure between GDP and several relevant macro variables (ibid.).
5 When more flexibility yields more fragility
If the reader is convinced of the robustness of the K+S model by its ability to reproduce the large
ensemble of stylised facts discussed above, then she will might follow us in its use as a “policy and
institutional laboratory” able to investigate the macro effects of different labour market set-ups. In
particular we can compare, other things being equal, a rigid regime – which we labelled Fordist –
with a Competitive one, characterised by the absence of labour protection (i.e. no firing restriction
for firms that can freely throw out labour force in excess); flexible wages; and, in its extreme version
no institutionally determined lower bounds to wages and no safety nets for the unemployed. We
compare the two archetypes in terms of (i) long-run rates of GDP growth; (ii) volatility of growth rates
themselves; (iii) likelihood of crises; (iv) productivity growth; (v) average unemployment rates; (vi)
frequency of full employment periods; (vii) average tenure rates of the workforce; (viii) concentration
coefficient of wage levels (Gini index as such a measure of inequality, here within the labour force).
First, let us compare the Fordist regime with the most extreme version of the Competitive one,
basically institution-free, with no employment protection and also with no minimum wage and no
unemployment benefits. Note that the latter is the nearest to textbooks “market perfection”. Well,
under such perfection the whole system is always near to collapse (cf. last column of Table 7: the
long-term rate of growth is two order of magnitude lower (basically zero) and the short-run is equally
dismal with extremely high unemployment rates, higher overall volatility and higher inequality.10
All this add to the results from Dosi et al. (2010). There, we found that the “Schumpeterian
engine” of innovation without any “Keynesian engine” of autonomous demand generation/stabilization
was basically sterile. The results here strengthen and refine such finding in that an institution-free
labour market tends to destroy the link between wages and aggregate demand formation.
Next, let us compare the Fordist regime with other milder forms of Competitive regimes, embedded
nonetheless into institution of wage and income support. Figure 6.a shows the aggregate patterns
10Note that, here and throughout we do not want to “calibrate and match”: rather our purpose is to emphasize robust
qualitative comparisons across set-ups.
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of GDP, consumption and investment in the other four alternative scenarios. The model is able to
generate long-run economic growth in all the four set-ups. Nonetheless, the levels of the three variables
are evidently different in the four cases (the vertical axis is in log). This is due to the different initial
institutional conditions, as in the long-run the paths remain approximately parallel.11 The Competitive
regime can generate the same output level of the Fordist only under full indexation of the minimum
wage (i.e., an integral productivity pass-trough with ψ1 = 1) and significant unemployment benefits.
In fact, Figure 6.b illustrates an enormously high structural level of unemployment, which in the two
Competitive set-ups without any form of State subsidy (cases 3 and 4) is around 50%.12 The dynamics
of real wages matches that of GDP: cf. Figure 6.c, which shows a clear divergence of the growth paths,
with an obvious impact on the income distribution between capitalists and workers, given GDP growth
rates are similar in all scenarios. Finally, Figure 6.d illustrates the time evolution of average mark-up
and the Gini index. As the latter shows, the distribution of wages among workers becomes particularly
skewed when wages may vary within the same firm and no form of welfare policy does mitigate income
disparity.13
Figures 7 and 8 presents both the short- and long-run dynamics of the four scenarios (except
the extreme Competitive one discusse above) by the direct comparison of key macro variables. The
Competitive set-ups show an overall fragile and more prone to crises dynamics when compared to the
Fordist, even in presence of active welfare policies. In fact, volatility of GDP (Figure 8.b), likelihood
of crises (Figure 8.c), unemployment rate (Figure 8.d) are significantly higher in the competitive
scenarios. Conversely, the Fordist case is in full employment for about 60% of the simulation time.
Productivity growth is significantly lower in the Competitive scenarios 3 and 4. And finally, in the
Competitive regimes inequality even among workers is higher and the more so the lower the constraints
in wage settings.
Table 7 presents the four specifications for the Competitive set-ups as a ratio with respect to the
Fordist case (the baseline). We perform a two means t test comparing whether the average values of
the four scenarios for the tested variables are significantly different from the baseline. The p-values14
reported show how the markedly under-performing Competitive regime – in all tested specifications –
is significantly worse than the Fordist one.
11The different initial institutional conditions are the partial indexation of the minimum wage and the lack of unem-
ployment benefits. Dosi et al. (2010) identifies this arrangement with a weak “Keynesian engine”.
12Indeed, the Fordist Regime shows a lower unemployment level and a higher activity level also when unemployment
benefit are set to zero and the minimum wage is partially indexed, as in the case of competitive scenarios 3 and 4.
13Note that in our model for sake of simplicity, and also in order to make an “a fortiori” argument, we do not have
either different skills or learning by doing.
14The test H0 is that there is no difference between the particular scenario variable average and the baseline.
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Figure 2
(a) BPF(6,32,12) productivity, unemployment and vacancy - Fordist
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(b) BPF(6,32,12) productivity, unemployment and vacancy - Competitive
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(c) Average log labour productivity - Fordist
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(d) Average log labour productivity - Competitive
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Figure 3
(a) Vacancy-unemployment vs productivity standard deviations - Fordist
( MC case = 6 )
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(b) Vacancy-unemployment vs productivity standard deviations - Competitive
( MC case = 9 )
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(c) Periodic separation probability (HP filter trend and deviation) - Fordist
0 50 100 150 200 250 300
1
1
.
0
1
1
.
2
1
1
.
4
1
1
.
6
Periodic Separation ( Fordism )
( MC case = 6 )
Time
S
e
p
a
r
a
t
i
o
n
 
p
r
o
b
a
b
i
l
i
t
y
(d) Periodic separation probability (HP filter trend and deviation) - Competitive
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Figure 4
(a) Beveridge curve - Fordist
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(b) Beveridge curve - Competitive
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(c) Matching function - Fordist
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( Outliers removed, included percentiles = 15−85 / MC case = 6 )
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(d) Matching function - Competitive
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Figure 5
(a) Wage curve - Fordist
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( Outliers removed, included percentiles = 15−85 / MC case = 6 )
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(b) Wage curve - Competitive
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(c) Okun curve - Fordist
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Okun Curve ( Fordism )
( Outliers removed, included percentiles = 15−85 / MC case = 6 )
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(d) Okun curve - Competitive
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
l l
l
l
l
ll
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l
l l
l
l
l
l
l
ll
l
−0.6 −0.4 −0.2 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6
−
0
.
3
−
0
.
2
−
0
.
1
0
.
0
0
.
1
0
.
2
0
.
3
Okun Curve ( Comp&NoBen )
( Outliers removed, included percentiles = 15−85 / MC case = 17 )
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Fordist regime u v v/u f s p
Standard deviation 0.05 0.234 0.266 0.152 0.153 0.051
Quarterly autocorrelation 0.56 0.604 0.613 0.476 0.467 0.888
u 1.00 -0.612 -0.718 0.488 0.602 0.130
v 1.000 0.990 -0.532 -0.612 0.084
v/u 1.000 -0.555 -0.647 0.050
f 1.000 0.968 -0.068
s 1.000 -0.050
p 1.000
Competitive regime u v v/u f s p
Standard deviation 0.19 0.167 0.295 0.148 0.15 0.055
Quarterly autocorrelation 0.72 0.405 0.605 0.126 0.10 0.939
u 1.00 -0.392 -0.854 -0.269 0.11 -0.306
v 1.000 0.813 0.616 0.31 0.116
v/u 1.000 0.518 0.11 0.259
f 1.000 0.48 -0.114
s 1.00 -0.065
p 1.000
Table 3: Correlation structure for Shimer (2005) statistics.
Fordist regime GDP Consumption Investment Productivity Real Wage
avg. growth rate 0.0277 0.0275 0.0316 0.0262 0.0258
(s.e.) 0.0004 0.0004 0.0003 0.0003 0.0004
ADF test (logs) -3.2757 -3.0960 -6.7267 -2.6176 -2.3970
(s.e.) 0.1681 0.2212 0.1533 0.2086 0.2113
(p-val.) 0.1247 0.1978 0.0100 0.3485 0.4057
(s.e.) 0.0320 0.0425 0.0000 0.0657 0.0791
ADF test (bpf) -8.2323 -8.5021 -9.0509 -8.3431 -7.9342
(s.e.) 0.2403 0.2170 0.2504 0.2036 0.1524
(p-val.) 0.0100 0.0100 0.0100 0.0100 0.0100
(s.e.) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
s.d. (bpf) 0.0608 0.0706 0.3012 0.0330 0.0423
(s.e.) 0.0033 0.0043 0.0151 0.0011 0.0011
relative s.d. (GDP) 1.0000 1.1623 4.9565 0.5433 0.6958
Competitive regime GDP Consumption Investment Productivity Real Wage
avg. growth rate 0.0284 0.0282 0.0314 0.0265 0.0260
(s.e.) 0.0003 0.0004 0.0005 0.0003 0.0003
ADF test (logs) -4.1301 -3.9620 -6.8954 -2.6941 -2.8085
(s.e.) 0.2895 0.2914 0.2611 0.3115 0.3457
(p-val.) 0.0721 0.0818 0.0100 0.3307 0.3268
(s.e.) 0.0383 0.0461 0.0000 0.1004 0.1005
ADF test (bpf) -9.0556 -8.4894 -9.2741 -8.0235 -8.4802
(s.e.) 0.2180 0.1462 0.1620 0.2167 0.2639
(p-val.) 0.0100 0.0100 0.0100 0.0100 0.0100
(s.e.) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
s.d. (bpf) 0.0882 0.0951 0.3044 0.0341 0.0438
(s.e.) 0.0019 0.0022 0.0060 0.0021 0.0014
relative s.d. (GDP) 1.0000 1.0783 3.4502 0.3860 0.4966
Table 4: Key macro statistics (bpf: bandpass-filtered (6,32,12) series; Monte Carlo simulation standard errors
and unit roots test p-values in parenthesis).
23
t− 4 t− 3 t− 2 t− 1 0 t+ 1 t+ 2 t+ 3 t+ 4
GDP (output) -0.0621 0.2389 0.5936 0.8849 1.0000 0.8849 0.5936 0.2389 -0.0621
(s.e.) 0.0361 0.0300 0.0174 0.0052 0.0000 0.0052 0.0174 0.0300 0.0361
(p-val.) 0.3776 0.0006 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0006 0.3776
Consumption -0.0620 0.2396 0.5811 0.8564 0.9662 0.8643 0.5953 0.2588 -0.0377
(s.e.) 0.0319 0.0268 0.0168 0.0068 0.0030 0.0125 0.0255 0.0369 0.0411
(p-val.) 0.6402 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0009 0.1457
Investment -0.5139 -0.5182 -0.3914 -0.1376 0.1812 0.4630 0.6225 0.6234 0.4942
(s.e.) 0.0169 0.0165 0.0205 0.0251 0.0268 0.0225 0.0147 0.0126 0.0228
(p-val.) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0746 0.0063 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Unemployment 0.1328 -0.0009 -0.1635 -0.3039 -0.3753 -0.3370 -0.2410 -0.1306 -0.0439
(s.e.) 0.0370 0.0274 0.0252 0.0349 0.0411 0.0440 0.0398 0.0356 0.0345
(p-val.) 0.1539 0.9662 0.0144 0.0001 0.0000 0.0002 0.0006 0.0620 0.3726
Productivity 0.4060 0.5457 0.6280 0.6159 0.5015 0.3121 0.1009 -0.0804 -0.2014
(s.e.) 0.0370 0.0290 0.0157 0.0242 0.0451 0.0580 0.0587 0.0493 0.0353
(p-val.) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0025 0.0284 0.0656 0.0084
Real Wage -0.0485 0.1879 0.4653 0.6966 0.7989 0.7381 0.5390 0.2777 0.0374
(s.e.) 0.0251 0.0284 0.0262 0.0161 0.0103 0.0215 0.0308 0.0344 0.0338
(p-val.) 0.8979 0.0057 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.5800
Mark-up 0.3780 0.2725 0.1000 -0.0651 -0.1575 -0.1568 -0.0942 -0.0254 0.0069
(s.e.) 0.0449 0.0506 0.0529 0.0485 0.0400 0.0340 0.0343 0.0370 0.0376
(p-val.) 0.0001 0.0037 0.0123 0.1456 0.0855 0.0587 0.2101 0.3384 0.5972
Total firm debt 0.0454 0.0006 -0.0400 -0.0560 -0.0404 -0.0073 0.0272 0.0456 0.0439
(s.e.) 0.0206 0.0393 0.0523 0.0561 0.0505 0.0372 0.0222 0.0125 0.0171
(p-val.) 0.9802 0.4289 0.0353 0.0202 0.0931 0.6393 0.9895 0.9992 0.9942
Vacancy rate -0.0633 0.1573 0.3938 0.5695 0.6208 0.5286 0.3338 0.1094 -0.0743
(s.e.) 0.0564 0.0653 0.0622 0.0492 0.0382 0.0393 0.0420 0.0390 0.0347
(p-val.) 0.0748 0.0117 0.0005 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0747 0.3963
Hiring rate -0.1334 -0.2942 -0.3991 -0.4196 -0.3556 -0.2359 -0.1007 0.0111 0.0794
(s.e.) 0.0416 0.0331 0.0560 0.0774 0.0789 0.0610 0.0390 0.0304 0.0328
(p-val.) 0.1988 0.0001 0.0002 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.1837 0.8848 0.2390
Firing rate -0.0656 -0.2103 -0.3262 -0.3822 -0.3622 -0.2761 -0.1503 -0.0267 0.0618
(s.e.) 0.0485 0.0341 0.0481 0.0727 0.0806 0.0672 0.0443 0.0309 0.0328
(p-val.) 0.2008 0.0047 0.0005 0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0265 0.8824 0.2919
Table 5: Fordist regime: Correlation structure between GDP and some macro variables (non-rate/ratio series
are bandpass-filtered (6,32,12); Monte Carlo simulation standard errors and lag significance test p-values (5%
significance) in parenthesis).
24
t− 4 t− 3 t− 2 t− 1 0 t+ 1 t+ 2 t+ 3 t+ 4
GDP -0.0684 0.2283 0.5852 0.8818 1.0000 0.8818 0.5852 0.2283 -0.0684
(s.e.) 0.0284 0.0256 0.0161 0.0051 0.0000 0.0051 0.0161 0.0256 0.0284
(p-val.) 0.5824 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.5824
Consumption -0.1010 0.1725 0.5171 0.8267 0.9849 0.9204 0.6662 0.3219 0.0060
(s.e.) 0.0278 0.0271 0.0195 0.0086 0.0013 0.0034 0.0125 0.0227 0.0276
(p-val.) 0.3512 0.0113 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.9555
Investment -0.3813 -0.4406 -0.4030 -0.2145 0.1062 0.4546 0.6994 0.7486 0.6036
(s.e.) 0.0296 0.0264 0.0258 0.0291 0.0306 0.0274 0.0195 0.0143 0.0262
(p-val.) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0015 0.2972 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Unemployment 0.0938 -0.2362 -0.5684 -0.7851 -0.8115 -0.6431 -0.3764 -0.1192 0.0543
(s.e.) 0.0448 0.0388 0.0256 0.0123 0.0120 0.0170 0.0192 0.0179 0.0192
(p-val.) 0.0311 0.0031 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.1331 0.9745
Productivity 0.3961 0.5465 0.6660 0.6985 0.6056 0.3893 0.1088 -0.1593 -0.3512
(s.e.) 0.0242 0.0214 0.0163 0.0178 0.0260 0.0316 0.0333 0.0324 0.0304
(p-val.) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2938 0.0258 0.0000
Real Wage 0.0202 0.2293 0.4944 0.7322 0.8459 0.7795 0.5503 0.2409 -0.0461
(s.e.) 0.0232 0.0194 0.0139 0.0081 0.0090 0.0110 0.0159 0.0258 0.0334
(p-val.) 0.9913 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.6977
Mark-up 0.4179 0.3664 0.2390 0.0895 -0.0255 -0.0775 -0.0834 -0.0814 -0.1007
(s.e.) 0.0324 0.0378 0.0423 0.0436 0.0410 0.0370 0.0397 0.0493 0.0554
(p-val.) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0044 0.1278 0.4041 0.5274 0.4650 0.0421 0.0062
Total firm debt 0.1296 0.1843 0.2024 0.1738 0.1078 0.0249 -0.0491 -0.0969 -0.1138
(s.e.) 0.0386 0.0343 0.0303 0.0279 0.0252 0.0231 0.0225 0.0254 0.0327
(p-val.) 0.1597 0.0165 0.0036 0.0119 0.0689 0.9878 0.9605 0.4759 0.1923
Vacancy rate -0.0546 0.0088 0.1254 0.3000 0.4907 0.6217 0.6266 0.4888 0.2553
(s.e.) 0.0184 0.0253 0.0316 0.0299 0.0226 0.0153 0.0119 0.0131 0.0220
(p-val.) 0.9792 0.9812 0.0644 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Hiring rate -0.2980 -0.3267 -0.2706 -0.1097 0.1274 0.3648 0.5138 0.5212 0.3971
(s.e.) 0.0257 0.0252 0.0251 0.0207 0.0203 0.0234 0.0209 0.0178 0.0272
(p-val.) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.2935 0.0907 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Firing rate 0.2565 0.2248 0.0802 -0.0797 -0.1426 -0.0652 0.1042 0.2518 0.2829
(s.e.) 0.0207 0.0195 0.0179 0.0179 0.0264 0.0354 0.0395 0.0360 0.0264
(p-val.) 0.0000 0.0001 0.8135 0.8257 0.0226 0.4577 0.1554 0.0010 0.0000
Table 6: Competitive regime: Correlation structure between GDP and some macro variables (non-rate/ratio
series are bandpass-filtered (6,32,12); Monte Carlo simulation standard errors and lag significance test p-values
(5% significance) in parenthesis).
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Figure 6: Aggregate dynamics of alternative scenarios
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(c) Average Real Wages and dispersion (log-levels)
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Figure 7: Comparison of key metrics on GDP and productivity among alternative scenarios (gray bands indicate the Monte Carlo averages 95% confidence interval).
The lines are simply a visual device highlighting the steepness of the differences among regimes.
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Figure 8: Comparison of key metrics on unemployment and inequality among alternative scenarios (gray bands indicate the Monte Carlo averages 95% confidence
interval). The lines are simply a visual device highlighting the steepness of the differences among regimes.
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Baseline[1] Ratio[2] Ratio[3] Ratio[4] Ratio[5]
GDP Growth 0.027 1.004 0.938 0.874 0.068
p-val. 0.801 0.071 0.000 0.000
Volatility of GDP Growth Rate 0.061 1.206 1.606 1.610 1.498
p-val. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Likelihood of Crises 0.151 1.381 1.919 1.973 1.483
p-val. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Productivity Growth 0.026 1.012 0.878 0.844 0.753
p-val. 0.334 0.000 0.000 0.000
Unemployment 0.008 11.672 69.931 77.054 84.757
p-val. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Frequency of Full Employment 0.597 0.213 0.080 0.042 0.067
p-val. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Tenure 15.430 0.158 0.193 0.201 1.506
p-val. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Vacancy 0.331 1.006 0.410 0.338 0.250
p-val. 0.841 0.000 0.000 0.000
Gini Coefficient 0.056 1.654 10.561 11.557 1.189
p-val. 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Table 7: Comparison of [1] baseline Fordist regime with: [2] Competitive with full indexation and benefits,
[3] Competitive with partial indexation and no benefits, [4] Competitive with full indexation and no benefits,
and [5] Competitive with no indexation or benefits (scenario/baseline ratio and p-value for a two means test
where H0: no difference with baseline).
6 Conclusions
The model robustly shows that more flexibility in terms of variations of monetary wages and labour
mobility – irrespectively of how it fosters allocative efficiency, a topic outside the concerns of this paper
– is prone to induce systematic coordination failures, higher macro volatility, higher unemployment,
higher frequency of crises. In fact, it is precisely the downward flexibility of wages and employment
– as profitable as it might be for individual firms –, and the related higher degrees of inequality that
lead recurrently as system level emergent properties to small and big aggregate demand failures. This
properties, we suggest, is also at the heart of both the 1929 and 2008 crises, no matter what the
triggering factors (often to be found at the financial level).
The experiments we have performed vindicate the notion that a too flexible wage-labour nexus can
be detrimental for aggregate economic dynamics: only when flexibility in wages and employment is
accompanied by policy measures which mitigates the recurrent downward pressures, the system does
not collapse. Furthermore, contrary to the argument that higher labour flexibility fosters productivity
growth, our model clearly shows the opposite: productivity in the Fordist and in the Competitive
regime with full indexation and unemployment benefit (which is still more volatile and prone to crises
than the Fordist) grows at the same path. Conversely, productivity growth is significantly lower in
most set-ups of the Competitive regime.
Here is where the failures of the Keynesian demand-generating mechanisms feedback upon the
Schumpeterian processes of technological advance. Crises are not the panaceas whereby the gales of
creative destruction break incumbent bottlenecks and open up new opportunities for innovation. On
the contrary, crises and the associated lack of aggregate demand reduce also the amount of resources
invested in innovative search (in our model the R&D of the machine-producing sector), shrinks the
investment in new vintages of equipment, and slows down the scrapping of old ones. The result is
a reduction in the rates of productivity growth and, if such recessionary events occur often enough,
a reduction in the long-term rates of growth of the economy, even beyond the permanent loss in
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GDP levels (as captured by Stiglitz, 1993). The findings here, in fact, complement those from Dosi
et al. (2016c) showing the pernicious long-term effect of austerity policies: after all austerity and
wage/unemployment driven deflation are exogenous (the former) and endogenous (the latter) shocks
upon the demand coordination process.
Needless to say, the normative implications are far reaching and point in directions opposite to the
fairytale of so called “structural reforms”. If one trusts the interpretative power of our model, more
employment guarantees, more rigidities in firing rules, less wage inequality, more welfare protection
are not only good for the workers concern, but also for the economy as a whole.
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Appendix
Technical change, production- and consumer-goods markets
The technology of a capital-good firms is (Aτi , B
τ
i ), where the former coefficient stands for the labour
productivity of the machine-tool manufactured by i for the consumption-good industry (a rough
measure of product quality), while the latter coefficient is the labour productivity of the production
technique employed by firm i itself. The positive integer t denotes the current technology vintage.
Given the monetary average wage wi paid by firm i, the unit cost of production of capital-good firms
is
ci,t =
wi,t
Bτi
(23)
With a fixed mark-up µ1 > 0 pricing rule, prices (pi) are defined as:
pi,t = (1 + µ1)ci,t (24)
The unit labour cost of production in the capital-good sector associated with each machine of vintage
t, produced by firm i is
cAτi ,t =
wi,t
Aτi
(25)
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Firms in the capital-good industry “adaptively” strive to increase their market shares and their
profits trying to improve their technology both via innovation and imitation. Both are costly processes:
firms invest in R&D a fraction of their past sales (Si):
RDi,t = νSi,t−1 (26)
Firms split their R&D efforts between innovation (IN) and imitation (IM) according to the parameter
ξ ∈ [0, 1]:
INi,t = ξRDi,t (27)
IMi,t = (1− ξ)RDi,t (28)
Innovation is a two-step process. The first one determines whether a firm obtains or not an access to
innovation – irrespectively of whether it is ultimately a success or a failure – through a draw from a
Bernoulli distribution, whose parameter θini,t is given by
θini,t = 1− e−ζ1INi,t (29)
with 0 < ζ1 < 1. If a firm innovates, it may draw a new machine embodying technology (A
inn
i , B
inn
i )
according to
Ainni,t = Ai,t(1 + x
A
i,t) (30)
Binni,t = Bi,t(1 + x
B
i,t) (31)
Alike innovation search, imitation follows a two steps procedure. The possibilities of accessing
imitation come from sampling a Bernoulli θimi,t :
θimi,t = 1− e−ζ2IMi,t (32)
with 0 < ζ2 < 1. Firms accessing the second stage are able to copy the technology of one of the
competitors (Aimi , B
im
i ). Capital-good firms select the machine to produce according to the following
rule:
min[phi,t + bc
h
Ahi ,j,t
], h = τ, in, im (33)
where b is a positive payback period parameter.
Firm j replaces machine Aτi ∈ Ξj,t according to its technology obsolescence as well as the price of
new machines:
RSj,t =
{
Aτi ∈ Ξj,t :
p∗i,t
cAτi ,j,t − c∗j,t
}
(34)
where p∗i,t and c
∗
j,t are the price and unit cost of production upon the new machines. Given their
current stock of machines, consumption-good firms compute average productivity (pij,t) and unit cost
of production (cj,t). Prices are set applying a variable markup (µj,t) on unit costs of production:
pj,t = (1 + µj,t)cj,t (35)
Mark-up variations are regulated by the evolution of firm market shares (fj,t):
µj,t = µj,t−1
(
υ
fj,t−1 − fj,t−2
fj,t−2
)
(36)
with 0 < υ < 1. Firm market shares evolve according to a replicator dynamics:
fj,t = fj,t−1
(
1 + χ
Ej,t − Et
Et
)
, Et =
F2∑
j=1
Ej,tfj,t−1 (37)
Further details are available in Dosi et al. (2010).
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Variables and parameters description
Variable Description
LDt Aggregate demand for workers
Ldj,t Number of demanded workers by firm j
Lsj,t Number of workers which queue in firm j
Lj,t Number of effectively hired workers by firm j
wMAXj,t Break-even (maximum) wage offered by firm j
woj,t Offered wage by firm j
wr`,t Required wage by worker `
ws`,t Satisfying wage for worker `
w`,t Effective wage (income) of worker `
wut Unemployment benefit
wminPolicyt Minimum policy wage
Table 8: Labour market variables (other variables described in Dosi et al., 2010).
Parameter Description Value
LS Aggregate supply of workers 250000
ψ Fraction of aggregate wage for unemployment subsidies 0.4
ψ1 Aggregate productivity pass-trough 0.5
ψ2 Firm-level productivity pass-through 0.5
 Desired wage increase 0.02
ωLa Number of firms to which send applications 5
Ts Wage memory periods 4
w0 Initial wage (income) of all workers 1
wminPolicy0 Initial minimum policy wage 1
ψ Fraction of aggregate wage for unemployment subsidies 0.4
MC Runs 50
Simulated periods (A) 400
“Burn-in” periods (B) 100
Effective periods (A−B) 300
Table 9: Labour market parameters (other parameters described in Dosi et al., 2010).
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